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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appellant, Richard A. Christenson, submits this brief in the appeal before this
court.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The Appellant:
Richard A, Christenson
The Defendant-Appellee:
Uwe and Ullrich Michel.
All other parties in the case below in which the matter appealed here was raised and
decided have no interest in the outcome of this appeal for reasons discussed herein.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, § 78-2-2, and authority to assign this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(4). This Court received this case by transfer from the
Supreme Court on December 23, 1998, and has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the judgment entered without notice to Richard A. Christenson should
be set aside for lack of in personam jurisdiction?
The standard of review on this issue is correctness:
Because Rule 4 (of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) governs service of process,...
and because whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional issue, the
standard of review is a correction-of-error standard:
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate
a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no
discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without
denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate,
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court.
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 at 771 (Utah App. 1997); citing, State
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. VijiU 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah l9S9)(citations omitted)

1

2. Whether the failure to give notice of the summary judgment motion deprived
Richard A. Christenson of due process?
The standard of review on this issue is correctness. (Id.)
3. Whether a judgment entered against "Christensen" affects the rights of Richard
A. Christenson?
The standard of review on this issue is correctness. (Id.)

APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Copy of the Rule is included in
the Appendix to this brief.)

^

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the propriety of a judgment entered in 1984 by the Third
District Court in a foreclosure case. The Plaintiff-Appellant is Mr. Richard A. Christenson.
Richard A. Christenson was not properly served or named in the case below. He was
never served with a summons and complaint in this case, and consequently never appeared
in the court below. His name is spelled differently than the pleadings of the case below.

<

(

2

Despite the non-appearance of Mr. Christenson, a summary judgment was entered.
The summary judgment motion was also not served on Mr. Christenson1. The motion was
granted. The judgment entered purports to foreclose the interests of "all defendants"
without regard to whether Mr. Christenson had been properly brought into the action or not.
Although Mr. Christenson was unaware of the judgment in 1984, in a subsequent
proceeding before the Third District Court, this old case has been asserted as a defense.
That subsequent proceeding involved Mr. Christenson and the parties Michel. Because the
judgment was asserted by Michels as a defense in 1998, a motion was filed in this case to
vacate the 1984 judgment due to lack of jurisdiction. The motion was unopposed by any of
the named parties and was granted by the lower court.
After the motion to vacate the judgment was granted, the parties Michael moved to
intervene and asked that the judgment be reinstated. Michels were allowed to intervene.
The judgment was reinstated. This appeal follows.
The questions raised by this appeal deal with the propriety of the entry of the
judgment in the first place and whether the interests of Mr. Christenson were effectively
dealt with under the requirements of jurisdiction and due process.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows:

2

In fact, none of the pleadings, discovery or motions were served on Mr.
Christenson.
3

1.

Mr. Richard A. Christenson was not properly served in this case. There is no

return of service in the case file evidencing service of process upon Mr. Christenson. (See
case file record. None of the documents in the record of this case include a return of service,
and none of the documents containing a certificate of mailing include Mr. Christenson as
arecipient.)
2.

Mr. Richard A. Christenson was not properly named as a party, since the

named Defendant is spelled Richard A. "Christensen". (See, e.g. Record on Appeal, pages
1, 116.)
3.

None of the documents, including the Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Summary Judgment Order were sent, served, or otherwise provided to Mr. Richard A.

,

Christenson. (See, e.g. Record on Appeal pages 37, 111, 113 and 117.)
4.

Mr., Christenson was not aware of the existence of this lawsuit or the judgment

entered in the lawsuit until very recently, when its existence was asserted in a different
matter, i.e., a defense to claims of Mr. Christenson's against certain property in the City of
Draper. (See, e.g. Record on Appeal, page 139.)
5.

The lower court was asked to vacate the judgment in this case due to lack of in

personal jurisdiction. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 136 - 142.)
6.

<

That motion was granted and the judgment was vacated. (See, Record on

Appeal, pages 148 - 149.)
i

4

7.

Parties Michel moved to intervene in this case and were granted leave to

intervene. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 156 - 163 and pages 324 - 325.)
8.

Parties Michel opposed the vacation of the judgment and asked that it be

reinstated. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 156 - 163.)
9.

The lower court reinstated the judgment. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 326 -

329.)
10. This appeal followed and was timely filed. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 332334.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In 1984, the Third District Court entered Summary Judgment in a judicial foreclosure
action against various defendants, including one Richard "Christenson". In 1994 Richard
A. "Christensen" brought an action to quiet title to certain real property which had not been
foreclosed

upon but which had a large number of potential claimants.

Defendants/Intervenors/Appellees Michel sought to have that 1984 judgment against
"Christensen" used as a defense against Mr. Christenson's quiet title action. Based upon the
arguments of Michels, Christenson filed a motion to vacate the earlier judgment. That
motion was granted and the judgment in this case vacated. Michels then moved to intervene
and asked that the earlier judgment be reinstated by the lower court. The lower court then

5

reinstated the judgment. That action was, at least, ambiguous, and as to Mr. Christenson,
improper.

t.

The impropriety stems from both lack of applicability of the judgment to Mr.
Christenson and voidness. The identity of the named parties to the earlier action and the
identity of the appellant here are facially different. The second 'applicability' problem with
the reinstatement decision here is that, assuming, arguendo, that the 1981 "Christensen" is
the same as the present "Christenson," the record of the earlier case shows conclusively that
no service of any kind was ever obtained upon the "Christensen" defendant in the earlier
action. Since there was no service in the earlier action, there was no due process as to
appellant here and he cannot be bound thereby.

(

The second general category of impropriety of the lower court decision reinstating
the 1984 judgment is that judgment is void ab initio. That voidness exists for at least three
reasons; (1) there was no due process; (2) there was no in personam jurisdiction, and (3) the
judgment had expired. This reason for reversing the lower court decision requires reversal
even if the 'applicability' issues are resolved in favor of sustaining the lower court's action
here.

v
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ARGUMENTS
I.

<

The judgment entered without notice to Richard A. Christenson should

be set aside for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
i

Fundamental to the validity of any judgment rendered against an individual is that the
court have personal jurisdiction over that individual. Personal jurisdiction could have been
established via routine service of process upon Mr. Christenson. That was not done, and as
a result, the court never had jurisdiction over Mr. Christenson. As recently set forth:
Because Rule 4 (of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) governs service of
process, ... and because whether service of process was proper is a
jurisdictional issue, the standard of review is a correction-of-error standard:
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate
a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no
discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without
denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate,
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court.
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 at 771 (Utah App. 1997); citing, State Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130,1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Mr. Christenson's
objection to the ex parte judgment against him is jurisdictional, and the Court has no
discretion but to vacate the earlier decision.
We are not dealing with an innocuous mistake, but rather a serious error which goes
to the fundamental rights of Mr. Christenson. For whatever reason, Mr. Christenson was not
hailed into court in 1981, and his rights cannot be affected by the outcome of the proceeding
to which he was not a party. The intervenors below inserted the rhetorical query at one point
in their memoranda attempting to support the ex parte judgment, "[i]s it reasonable to
7

believe that Judge Dee would have signed an Order binding all defendants if some of the
defendants had not been served?" The answer to this rhetorical question is "Of course it is
reasonable." It happened. The "Judgment" was not prepared by Judge Dee. It was authored
by an attorney for one of the parties in that earlier action, Mr. Richard H. Nebeker, and
signed by Judge Dee. The language was understandably overreaching. No one caught it at
the time. But clearly the language was inartfully over-broad. The answers to the other
rhetorical questions posed by Intervenors are equally apparent when one looks at the record.
The judgment against Mr. "Christensen" is void as to Mr. Christenson. It should be
vacated. It is fundamental to due process that a party be served process and have an
opportunity to be heard before a judgment be entered against him. As stated in 62B Am Jur
2d, Process:

(.

^
§6. Effect of omission of service of process.
One who is not served with process does not have the
status of a party to the proceeding. The parties and their case
must be brought before the court, and this is accomplished by
the use of process.
A judgment against one who was not given notice in the
manner required by law of the action or proceeding in which
such judgment was rendered lacks all the attributes of a judicial
determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can
never be upheld where justice is fairly administered. A
judgment lacking lawful service of process is void unless
service is waived by appearance or otherwise, and this is true
regardless of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of
the proceedings. A judgment is subject to collateral attack
where it is rendered against one who was never legally served
with process of the court.
8

The Summary Judgment Order entered in the case in 1984 was sloppily drafted and
refers generally and broadly to "all right, title and interest of all the Defendants" rather than
referring to only those Defendants who had been properly served and brought into the
action. Although the judgment should be read to refer only to those who are properly
named, properly spelled (i.e., identified), and properly served with process, the broad
language of the judgment could arguably reach even the interests of the non-served
Defendant "Christensen".
Although Mr. Christenson has a differently spelled last name, the parties Michel are
asserting that the judgement reaches the interests of Mr. Christenson. Since Mr. Christenson
was not brought into the case, never given an opportunity to know of its existence, not sent
a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment, not given a copy of the Summary Judgment
at the time it was entered, and not otherwise made aware or brought into this case at any
time, the judgment cannot affect the interests of Mr. Christenson. As to Mr. Christenson's
interest, this judgment was properly vacated by the lower court. The decision to reinstate
the judgment was improper.
The Intervenors Michel offered no opposing facts nor any fact-based objections to
the lower court. They merely offered hyperbole and argument. That was no basis to reinstate
the judgment.

9

Intervenors assert that the interests of all named defendants in the 1981 action were
"barred and forever foreclosed." However, Christenson was not a named defendant in the
1981 action. Accordingly, his interest in the real property was not extinguished. Even so,
being "named" does not alone allow the court to acquire jurisdiction. One must be both
"named" and "served" with process. There was no service on Mr. Christenson.
Christenson based his motion to vacate upon fatally defective service of process (i.e.,
he was never served with process). In interpreting Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the courts have held, "[b]ut where the judgment is void because of a fatally
defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application." Garcia
v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288 at 290 (Utah 1986); see also, Woody v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465
(1969). The three month statute of limitations defense raised by Intervenors in their
arguments belowr is not applicable }

2

Intervenors correctly point in their arguments to the amendment Rule 60(b) has
undergone, and that subsection (4) of the old rule dealt with ineffective personal service.
But, it is clear that when courts interpreted this old provision, they have always refrained
from denying a party due process and a right to be heard based upon an inane and
completely arbitrary time limit. Under the rule proposed by intervenors Michel, the
original rule could have set the statutory time limit at 1 month, or 6 months, or 1 year,
while having the same effect of denying individuals their Constitutional right to a
hearing. The courts of Utah, as shown in the cases cited above, have been loathe to do
the very thing Intervenors asked of the lower Court. Intervenors relies upon Lincoln
Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D. T. Southern Properties for the proposition that courts
should "very cautiously" disregard the three month limitation period. Lincoln dealt with
an appeal based upon excusable neglect, in which the moving party was served, he just
failed to respond,, That is not the case here.
10

II.
The failure to give no tic i n I I I i n ". m n m 11111.«i in
A, Christensoo of due process

111 m I | > m 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 m 11 I in m i in in n I n pn\

m • i I II! 11 I i . 11 n i

In order to preserve judicial resources and reach auuia^, there is a presumption that
judgments are valid. However, this is only a presumption ,nJ one ihat can be overcome
with appropriate proof offered b> a challenging party. - iic;. ."<.* J f •,: Dee entered judgment,

belief was wrong. On the other hand, he may have understood "all" defendants to refer only
to those over whom he had jurisdiction, and not Mr. "Cliristensen " He may also have not
carefully considered the language, and relied upon the attorneys in that earlier action to bring

to speculate and ask their speculation to be accepted by the Court as a basis for "reinstating"
an otherwise void or inapplicable judgment in this case.
- We are also coiuidei

u p P; « tarnation presented in the Motion t~ V,ic~^ ! i

would have taken steps necessary to insure that Mr. Christenson was either relieved of the
judgment or else properly sei v ed andfcrroughtinto the ! OS S action before entry of any
judgment was issued wl licl 1 n light affect 1 tini.

J

.' •

presented than the underlv i P <: 'ase file? Both sides, as well as the lower Coi irt, 1 ia\ e 1: lad tl le

] ]

opportunity to examine it. From the file it is apparent that if the Mr. Christenson who is a
party to this action was intended to be a party in the earlier suit, he was not properly named
in the suit due to the misspelling of his last name.
Along with valuing finality in judgments, courts must also value accuracy, proper
procedure, due process and exactitude. These were all missing from the 1981 action. The
file in this case shows Mr. Christenson was never served with process in the 1981 action and
never filed an answer in the 1981 action. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that a "civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, [with appropriate
and timely service within 120 days under Rule 4(b)] or (2) by service of a summons
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." (Emphasis added.) The
requirements of Rule 3 and 4 were not met, and the action effectively did not even
commence as to Mr. Christenson. The 1981 action is void as to Mr. Christenson.
From the record below we find that Mr. Christenson was not sent copies of the
discovery and notices of deposition. If he had been served, why did he not get copies mailed
to him? The earlier case file shows clearly that he was not sent a copy of the Motion for
Summary Judgement in the case. If he had been served, why did he not get a copy mailed
to him? He was not sent a copy of the Summary Judgment Order. If he had been served,
why did he not get a copy mailed to him?

12

• ,;; 1 1 le i ecoi d is clear

I here is no basis for coi lcluding anything other thai i Mr.

Christenson v\;i\ nni stTvnl n ih^ ruse

III. A judgment entered against "Christensen" does not affect the rights of Richard
A. Christenson.
The rat
c i , •• •

. ,*
- j'

.W;*M.

,. ,v\

• *- *

.instensen "
-

.okmg u the phone

"' listed i i ins to o \ er foi in: ( i) pages,

and includes 25 "R." or "Rick" or "Richard Christensens."3 The incorrect spelling of a name
in a pleading is material and cannot be dismissed as a "trivial" oversight, particularly where
no servLi i oi ui.uvu >n that name for mv document in the case.
C "p **

^

the parties cuiicn*1, stand, Mi. Cim&ieiifcuii •* f

nreiudio

$1,850,000.00 if tl le 1934 judgment is not vacated. Further, the court never took si_r~ *J
rectify tl le error, and it is only through the efforts of Mr Christenson that this probl* ••) is
even being addi essed . ":1l!1 s it ci in entlj stands, tl lis Cox n t cannot just re-spell the name of a
defendant without substantial prejudice to Mr. Christenson
The lown <. purl refusal t<> respell Mr. Christenson's name. This refusal leaves the
status of the lower court decision ambiguous, Does the lower court intend, by its refusal to

3

There are also multiple listings, of hundreds oi names, for *\ nnstenso;
"Christiansen", "Christiensen", and "Christison." All " hose name- :\rr wn'characters of matching the names in the earlier action
13

correct the spelling, to leave the judgment without effect as to Mr. Christenson? Or, rather,
does the lower court by its refusal to vacate the judgment to leave the judgment with some
effect as to Mr. Christenson? This ambiguity should be cleared through the decision of this
appeals court, determining as a matter of law that the 1984 judgment (in the 1981 case) is
inapplicable to Mr. Richard A. Christenson.

CONCLUSION
Neither Mr. "Christensen" nor Mr. Christenson was served with process in 1981.
When we examine the case file, there is nothing that would suggest that either Mr.
"Christensen" or Mr. Christenson was served or had notice of the underlying action. The
record is clear. There is no return of service for Mr. Christenson nor for Mr. "Christensen".
There is no certificate of mailing of any document showing either Mr. "Christensen" or Mr.
Christenson was made a party to the earlier action. There was no service.
Since Mr. Christenson was not served at all in the earlier action, the 1984 judgment,
as to Mr. Christenson, must be vacated. The law is clear on this point.
Mr. Christenson is not the same as Mr. "Christensen". Both are valid, common
names. Even if the earlier action was intended to name Mr. Christenson, it was misspelled
and did not succeed. The judgment is not applicable to appellant.

14

DATED this 27th day of May, i QQQ
NELSO\. SNUFFER*

C

Denver Snuffer J
Attorney^ for \ntV!!ant Richard A Chnstenson
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ADDENDUM
1.

Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Orders from Page 326 to 329 of the Record.
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ADDENDUM 1

•OCEDUKE

190
nt for purposes of appeal. The time for
from a judgment., tilled by a party's
lost-judgment motion, starts to run on
when the trial court enters its signed
nying the motion- Gaiiardo v. Boiinder,
816 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
gh captioned "Objections to the Proidings, Conclusions and Judgment,*
;'s post-trial motion was in substance
jnder this rule, inasmuch as it asked
:o aJter its Surfings and to amend its
s and judgments: therefore, defenion toiJed the time for fling a notice
ntiJ this morion -^as denied. Reeves
it, 915 P.2d 1072 'Utah Ct. App.

? verdict made no award of general
d was deficient in form, plaintiffs
nand that the jury be sent back for
erations, and her failure to object
t at a bench conference regarding
ess of the verdict constituted
right to a new trial or to appeal
ohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d
>ecial verdict failed to mention
igard to one p a r t of a cause of
3 plain tiff failed to raise this
efore the j u r y was discharged,
eemed waived and could not be
ion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land
;her, 605 R2d 1240 (Utah 1980),
!onal Farmers"' Union Property
ompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 R2d
635 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson.
26 P.2d 722 (1953); Howard v.
L 2d 149. 356 P.2d 275 (I960);
atz Real Estate. Inc., 15 Utah
?98 (1964); Hanson v. General
, 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61
g. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
(1964); Porcupine Reservoir
?ller Corp., 15* Utah 2d 318,
4); Watson v. Anderson, 29
3
.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v.
31 (Utah 1976); Edgar v.
05 (Utah 1977); l i m e Com.
ihall, 575 R2d 701 (Utah
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
• Pontiac, Lac. v. Osborne,
tan 1981); Mulherin v.
528 R2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
Xty, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah
artland Cement Co. v.
59 (Utah 1983): Nelson v.
207 (Utah 1983); Golden
mtas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
y, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
ified Washington County
P2d 679 fUtah 1986);
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987);
0P.2d 131S iU:ah 1987);
R2d 1372 ;U:ahCt. App.
Co. v. Schettier. 768 P.2d
9); Parvzek v. Paryzek,
App. 1989): Allred v.
ah Ct. App. 1992); Ong
h Ave. Corp.. 350 P2d

UTAH ffiJLES t}V CIVIL PROCEIJI TO,

KIIIII

WW*

'4|7(Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P2d
:
T!78(Utah CtApp. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v.
ootids, 882 PM 650 Oltah 1994): Commercial
^gijCarp. v. Siggard, 936 R2d 1105 (Utah Ct.

App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329
Utah
Utah Adv.
Adv Rep.
R/»n 20
20 (Utah
mtah Ct.
Ct. App.
Ann. 1997);
1997): PDQ
PDQ
Lube Ctr., Inc. v.-Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah, Ct.
App. 1997).

CO.! LATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2tL — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
u U to 14, 29 et sea., 187 to 19L
CJ£-

— S6

CJJ S

- - -Vew ^ ^

^

1 3 e I : sec

-

115. 116. 122 to 127
AX-R- — Consent as grsund of vacating
^jo^zBent, or granting new tnai. in civil czse,
tiler expiration of term or time prescribed by
juoxte or rules of court. 3 A.I,.R.3d 1191.
propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or
fettiement of civil case. 6 AJLR-2d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial In civil
case, 7AL.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A L R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial erect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A L R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A_L JL3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
AJLR3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom, during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
-I LJLZd 126.
• • -

Amendment, after expiration of time for Sling motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 AJL.-R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 104L
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A-LJUth 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A J J U t h 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A i J U t h 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new trial granted on ground of inadequacy of damages — modern cases, 5 AJLR.5th
875.
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 AJLR.5th 699.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness - •
modern cases, 96 ALJL Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions;
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modem, cases,, 97 A J R
Fed. 189.

.Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical, mistakes in judgments, orders or other par f:;s
of the record and errors therein, arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at a n y time of its own initiative or on the motion of any

I
I
f
i

hi)

party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such, mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed .in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5/ the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(D,(2), or(3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding

Rule 60

was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality, of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a-court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a. judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent acnon.
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Ruie
4(e; ann the defendant has failed to appear in
said aeion-'This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule. The committee concluded
the ^an<» was ambiguous and possibly in con-

flict with rales permitting service by means
other than personal service.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment deleted the former fourth ground for a
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the
Advisory Committee Note above, and renumbered the grounds accordingly.
Compiler's Notes- — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, FJR.CJl

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Any other reason justifying relief*
—Dffanh judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
AppealsClerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Kffifyt of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Farm of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—-Divuiue action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvener.ee, surprise or excusable
^?£iect.

— Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
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No claim for relief
—Delayed motion for new triaL
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost biH
—Failure to file notice of appeal. .
—Nanreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial courts discretion.
—.I7n»Tfipl«vmPTt t rtrrjt jyyn jmtinr^ a p p e a l .

—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.
Reversal ofjudgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Migtalr* inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time.*
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—-Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
•Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision To A 7' embodies three require'
ments: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6fc .„
second, that the reason justify relief; and thirdt •$
that the motion be made within a reasonable *

')§ &*:'Lan*> v. South Cent. Utah TV
*|0d-13O4 (Utah 1982); Richinn
gjjpman & Sons, 817 R2d 382 OJ
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to s€
- ^ t based on Subdivisions (bXl)
wj5 motion for a new trial claimed 1
tiolated Rule 5(a) on several occa
^riding defendant with a copy <
thereby causing surprise, centerij
tiffs failure to provide a copy of hi
jununary judgment to defendant
^tter claimed was a clear showing
pjaintifFs part, the trial court coi
Iieved in denying defendants n
fraud was not present in what coui
gred a lapse in procedure by piaint:
Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (U
1987).

Defendants claim that he mis
tered into an ill-advised stipulat
fbUy understanding its consequen
xectly characterized by trial court
inadvertence, surprise or neglect u
vision (bXl); because Subdivision (fc
Subdivision (bX7) could not apply a
be used to circumvent the three-i
period. Rich ins v. Delbert Chipman
R2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In an action against a county fi
construction and maintenance of a
the county was not entitled to i
Subdivision 0>X7) because of a chi
ernmental immunity law, since
Court decision specifically stated tl
relied on by the county did not cha
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n,!
(Utah Ct App. 1997).
—Default judgment.
It was not an abuse of discretion
court to relieve a defendant from
illow her to answer where it was
ibe had mistakenly believed that si
protected by a divorce decree and fc
decree required her husband to be
pation and defend the action for
Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 R2d
Trial judge did not abuse discreti
i&g to set aside default judgment *
dant asserted that he thought th
was invalid anH therefore paid no
it Board of Educ v. Cox, 14 Utah
,R2d 806 (1963).
v* Where any reasonable excuse if
defaulting party, courts generally t
panting relief from a default judgr
* appears that to do so would result
tial injustice
to the adve:
Westinghouse Elec Supply Co.
v Ursen Contractor, 544 R2d 876 (I
^-Subdivision 0>X7) did not appl:
:
-' *here defendant husband sought t<
•• 5*&ult judgment of divorce 5 'Vi IT
: ?* entry on the grounds that plain;
; ^correctly stated the extent of his
\:-.«at he had not received a ccpy oft;
•r\ S**orce decree; therefore the court \
•jction to disturb the judgment. K<
*a*imakis. 546 R2d 888 (Utah 19
Where defendant stated he faiie

ADDENDU

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 2 8 1938
w

DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR.. =2022
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE. P.C.
Ancmeys for Defendant Richard A. Christer.son
10SS5 South State Street
Sandy. UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400

/SALT U S E COUNTY!" -• '

'V>

V U i v Deoury
. Wi^vj
Cf«nc
•

'

•

^

"

^

'

-

>

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a national association.

)
)

ORDER VACATING PRIOR
ORDER OF JULY 29, 1998

Plaintiff.
vs.

RICHARD F. McKEEN, et al.,

Civil No. C-81-6354

Defendants.

)

Judse J. Dennis Frederick

The Court, after reviewing a Motion from proposed Intervenors Michels, conducting a
telephone conference with Counsel Denver C. Snuffer. Jr. and Bruce Nelson, and being advised
in the premises, enters the following order:
1.

The Order of July 29, 1998 is set aside, without prejudice.

2.

The parties may purse this matter further before this court in further proceedings

before either the undersigned Judge or Judge David Young in the case pending before him
known as Civil No. 960902187.

i

'P

DATED this j f f day of .1
COURT:

J. Dennis rrederick \
Districti Coun Juaee
/

APPROVED A& TO FORM.

^--'Derive.r C^Snuffer, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employeUxbvtfie office of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle. P.C. and
that I caused to either be placed in the Unkeo^^tes mail, first class, postage prepaid: faxed:
and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of th©>fjoregoing ORDER VACATING
JUDGMENT AGAINST RICHARETA. "CHRISTENSEN^to'the following:
Brace J. Nelson
NELSON RASMUSSEN CHRISTENSEN
215 South State. SujjrWO
Sait Lake Ciry. UT84111

Sent via?"
Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

^SSfe**
Brace J. Nelson (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Michels (Intervenors)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a
national association,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
RENEWED MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGMENT OF RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON

vs.

RICHARD F. MCKEEN, et al.
Defendants.

Civil No. C-S1-6354
Judse J. Dennis Frederick

The Court, having received a Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to the Code of
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 on the matter of Defendant Richard A Christenson's
Renewed Motion to Vacate Judgment of Richard A Christenson dated September 10. 1998. and
having read and considered the Memorandum of points and authorities filed in support of said
Motion by Defendant, the Objection to said Motion filed by Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, Ullrich

Michel and Corolla Michel (hereinafter "Michel") as Intervenors in this matter and the
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, the Coun now hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES:
1.

Defendant Richard A Christenson's Motion to Vacate Judgment is DENIED for
the reasons set forth in the opposite Memorandum submitted by Michel.

SO ORDERED this J^Tday of.

teft£r,1998.
BY"

Approved as to form:

CJQea^A^iiBfey
Attornev foriJDefendant Christenson

o

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, P.C.
and that I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid;
faxed; and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF to the following:

Bruce J. Nelson
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
r-b^

DATED this 2-1-

day of May, 1999.

Sent via:
X Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

